

## Message Text

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ACTION EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 IO-10 DODE-00 ISO-00 AEC-05 CIAE-00 H-01

INR-05 L-02 NSAE-00 OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-01 PM-03 PRS-01

SAJ-01 SAM-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06 TRSE-00 RSC-01

NSC-05 ACDA-05 /080 W  
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P R 081845Z NOV 74

FM USMISSION NATO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8667

INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

ALL NATO CAPITALS 4630

USDEL MBFR VIENNA

USMISSION GENEVA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 3 USNATO 6225

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, NATO, UR

SUBJECT: NATO/IS PAPER ON CSCE/MBFR LINKAGE

GENEVA FOR USDEL CSCE

REF: USNATO 6186

1. MISSION TRANSMITS BELOW, PER REFTEL, NATO/IS WORKING PAPER ON CSCE/MBFR LINKAGE. PAPER INCLUDES AT PARA 6-E OPTION DRAFTED BY U.S. DEL TO DESCRIBE POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVE WHICH U.S. REP MENTIONED IN NOVEMBER 6 SPC MEETING (PARA 5, REFTEL). IN PRESENTING OPTION, WE STRESSED AGAIN THAT IT IN NO WAY REPRESENTED AN INDICATION OF U.S. PREFERRED OUTCOME ON LINKAGE QUESTION, BUT WAS SUBMITTED SOLELY TO COVER GREATER NUMBER OF POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVES,

2. FRG DEL HAS INFORMED US PRIVATELY THAT IT FEELS CURRENT SPC PHASE OF ALLIANCE LINKAGE STUDY CAN BE CLOSED IN NEAR FUTURE SINCE IS DRAFT NOW REPRESENTS A SUFFICIENT FOUNDATION FOR CONFIDENTIAL

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FURTHER DISCUSSION BY COUNCIL AND BY MINISTERS, IF THEY WISH TO DO SO, AT DECEMBER MEETING.

3. MISSION SHARES GERMAN VIEW THAT LITTLE MORE CAN BE DONE

IN SPC AND WOULD WELCOME DEPARTMENT GUIDANCE BOTH ON NEXT STEPS AND ON PAPER TRANSMITTED BELOW FOR USE IN NEXT SPC LINKAGE DISCUSSION, NOVEMBER 14.

4. BEGIN TEXT

1. AT THE COUNCIL MEETING ON 2ND OCTOBER, THE ACTING PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED STATES RAISED THE POSSIBILITY OF TURNING THE TABLES ON THE SOVIET UNION WHICH APPEARED TO LINK MOVEMENT IN MBFR TO PROGRESS IN THE CSCE BY ESTABLISHING SUCH A LINK OURSELVES, BUT IN REVERSE FORM, I.E. MAKING PROGRESS IN THE CSCE CONTINGENT UPON EASTERN MOVEMENT IN MBFR.

2. AS AGREED BY THE COUNCIL ON THAT OCCASION, THE SENIOR POLITICAL COMMITTEE HAD DISCUSSED THE SUBJECT WITH A VIEW TO CLARIFYING THE ISSUES INVOLVED BEFORE FURTHER DEBATE IN THE COUNCIL.

3. THE UNITED STATES INITIATIVE IN PROPOSING THAT THE MATTER SHOULD BE DISCUSSED WAS GENERALLY WELCOMED BY THE SENIOR POLITICAL COMMITTEE. THE FRENCH REPRESENTATIVE STRESSED, GIWEVER? THAT THERE WAS NO CHANGE IN HIS GOVERNMENT'S POSITION; GIVEN THAT THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT DID NOT FAVOUR THE HOLDING OF THE MBFR NEGOTIATIONS AND ACCORDINGLY DID NOT PARTICIPATE IN THOSE NEGOTIATIONS, IT DID NOT SEE GROUNDS FOR A LINK BETWEEN MBFR AND CSCE. OTHER DELEGATIONS EXPRESSED DOUBTS ABOUT THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE REVERSE LINKAGE AND STRESSED THE DIFFICULTIES INHERENT IN IMPLEMENTING IT AT THIS TIME.

4. THE SPC'S ANALYSIS OF THE POINTS INVOLVED IS AS FOLLOWS.

BASIC PROBLEMS ARISING FROM NATURE OF NEGOTIATIONS

5. ALTHOUGH INTERRELATED HISTORICALLY, CSCE AND MBFR ARE CHARACTERISED BY CERTAIN BASIC DIFFERENCES WHICH COMPLICATE  
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THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A LINK:

(A) THE DIFFERENCE IN TIMESCALES. CSCE APPEARS CERTAIN TO END LONG BEFORE MBFR IS COMPLETED, THOUGH A POSSIBILITY EXISTS THAT PHASE 1 OF MBFR COULD BE CONCLUDED AT ABOUT THE SAME TIME AS THE CSCE. IT WOULD BE MOST DIFFICULT TO GUARANTEE THAT THE SOVIET UNION WOULD, IN THE EVENT, RESPECT ANY AGREEMENT TO PAY A PRICE IN MBFR FOR PROGRESS IN CSCE;

(B) THE DIFFERENCE IN PARTICIPATION BETWEEN THE TWO NEGOTIATIONS; MBFR IS CONFINED TO NATO AND WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES AND IS BLOC-TO-BLOC, WHILE CSCE INCLUDES NEUTRAL AND NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES. THE IDEA OF REVERSE LINKAGE WOULD PROBABLY BE UNACCEPTABLE TO MANY IF NOT

MOST NEUTRAL AND NON-ALIGNED PARTICIPANTS IN THE CSCE, AND ITS IMPLEMENTATION COULD WELL HAVE THE EFFECT OF ALIENATING THEM FROM THE OBJECTIVES AND TACTICS BEING PURSUED IN THE CSCE BY ALLIED GOVERNMENTS;

(C) IN BOTH CSCE AND MBFR, BOTH EAST AND WEST HAVE OBJECTIVES WHICH THEY ARE SEEKING TO ACHIEVE. THE SOVIET UNION IS SEEKING TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE EXTENT TO WHICH ALLIED COUNTRIES ARE THE DEMANDEURS IN MBFR. IN TRYING TO TURN THE TABLES, A PROBLEM IS THAT THE ALLIES ARE ALSO DEMANDEURS IN GENEVA, AND THE SOVIETS ARE CLOSER THAN THE WEST TO HAVING ACHIEVED THEIR AIMS. THUS THEY ARE SOME WAY TO ACHIEVING THEIR MAIN OBJECTIVE IN BASKET I, THOUGH NOTHING IS YET FINALIZED. THEIR REMAINING MAJOR OBJECTIVES APPEAR TO BE CONFIRMATION OF THE TERRITORIAL AND POLITICAL STATUS QUO IN EUROPE THROUGH THE HOLDING OF A FINAL PHASE AT SUMMIT LEVEL, A FINAL DOCUMENT IN A FORM ACCEPTABLE TO THEM, AND AGREEMENT TO FOLLOW-UP MEASURES SATISFACTORY FROM THEIR VIEWPOINT. HOW MUCH OF A PRICE THEY WILL BE PREPARED TO PAY FOR ATTAINMENT OF THESE OBJECTIVES IS NOT, HOWEVER, CLEAR.

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 3 USNATO 6225

ALTERNATIVE OPTIONS

6. THE FOLLOWING ARE POSSIBLE OPTIONS:

A. A SERIES OF BILATERAL DEMARCHES STRESSING THE INEVITABLY INTERDEPENDENT NATURE OF THE TWO NEGOTIATIONS, BUT WITHOUT ANY FORMAL REFERENCE TO REVERSE LINKAGE.

ADVANTAGE SUCH A STEP COULD BE TAKEN AT ANY TIME

AND WOULD COMMIT THE ALLIANCE TO NO  
PARTICULAR LINE OF ACTION. IT COULD BE  
A PRELIMINARY TO MORE SPECIFIC MEASURES.

DISADVANTAGES (I) BECAUSE OF INEVITABLE VARIATIONS IN  
PRESENTATION OF SEPARATE DEMARCHES, THIS  
WOULD INVITE SOVIET WEDGE-DRIVING. IT  
WOULD PUT NO SPECIFIC PRESSURE ON THE  
WARSAW PACT. FAILURE BY SOME COUNTRIES  
TO JOIN IN THE DEMARCHES WOULD FURTHER  
INCREASE WEDGE-DRIVING.

(II) SUCH DEMARCHES COULD ENCOURAGE THE SOVIET  
UNION TO PRESS THEIR OWN LINKAGE MORE  
STRONGLY.

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B. SIMILAR ACTION TO "A", BUT CONDUCTED NOT THROUGH  
BILATERAL APPROACHES, BUT BY SUITABLE WORDING IN THE COMMUNIQUE  
OF THE DECEMBER MINISTERIAL MEETING, WHICH MIGHT REFER BACK  
APPROPRIATELY TO PARAGRAPH 14 OF THE BONN COMMUNIQUE OF  
31ST MAY, 1972, AND PARAGRAPH 9 OF THE BRUSSELS COMMUNIQUE OF  
8TH DECEMBER, 1972.

ADVANTAGE

AS IN THE CASE OF A, WHILE AVOIDING  
DISADVANTAGE (I) TO A. IN ADDITION,  
THIS APPROACH WOULD SERVE TO UNDERLINE  
THE CONSISTENCY OF THE STANCE OF THE  
GOVERNMENTS CONCERNED.

DISADVANTAGE

AS IN DISADVANTAGE (II) TO A.

C. AN INDICATION TO THE SOVIET UNION THAT, UNTIL THERE WAS  
PROGRESS IN MBFR, THE CSCE DISCUSSIONS, AT PRESENT HELD UP BY  
SOVIET TACTICS, WOULD BE SLOWED DOWN YET FURTHER BY ACTION ON THE  
ALLIED SIDE WHO, BY CONTRAST, HAD, TO DATE, BEEN DOING THEIR  
UTMOST TO MOVE THE CSCE DISCUSSIONS FORWARD.

ADVANTAGE

IT WOULD PLAY ON SOVIET UNEASE ABOUT THE  
EFFECTS OF PROTRACTED DISCUSSION OF  
BASKET III, AS WELL AS ON THEIR DESIRE  
FOR A RAPID CONCLUSION IN GENERAL,  
ASSUMING THAT THE SOVIET UNION  
REALLY ATTACH IMPORTANCE TO THIS.

DISADVANTAGES

(I) IT PREMISES READINESS TO SLOW DOWN  
STAGE II NEGOTIATIONS, PERHAPS IN FACE  
OF SOVIET BAIT TO INVITE PROGRESS. IF  
SUCCESSFUL IT WOULD ENTAIL SPEEDING UP  
OF STAGE II.

(II) NEITHER A "SLOW DOWN" NOR AN EVENTUAL  
"SPEED UP" IN GENEVA IS LIKELY TO  
RECEIVE THE SUPPORT OF ALL THE NON-NATO  
AND NON-WARSAW PACT PARTICIPANTS IN

CSCE, NOR OF PUBLIC OPINION. THE  
SOVIET UNION WOULD PLAY ON THIS.  
(III) THE ALLIED GOVERNMENTS WOULD HAVE TO  
DECIDE HOW, IN THE EVENT OF SOVIET  
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COMPLIANCE, TO GIVE EFFECT TO THEIR  
PROMISE OF AN EARLY END TO THE  
CONFERENCE WITHOUT PREJUDICING ESSENTIAL  
WESTERN INTERESTS. NO ESSENTIAL AIMS IN  
BASKET III OR ELSEWHERE COULD  
ABANDONED. IN THE EVENT OF SOVIET  
COMPLIANCE, THE ALLIANCE WOULD ALSO HAVE  
TO DECIDE WHAT EASTERN CONCESSIONS IN  
MBFR WOULD BE THOUGHT SUFFICIENT TO  
JUSTIFY LETTING OFF THE BRAKE IN GENEVA.  
BECAUSE THE CSCE WOULD BE CONCLUDED  
BEFORE A FINAL MBFR AGREEMENT THERE  
WOULD BE A PROBLEM OF ENSURING THAT  
SOVIET CONCESSIONS IN VIENNA WERE

RESPECTED AND OF LASTING VALUE.  
(IV) THE PRESSURES CREATED WOULD STRAIN  
ALLIANCE COHESION AND GIVE FRESH  
OPPORTUNITIES FOR SOVIET WEDGE-DRIVING,  
PARTICULARLY BETWEEN THE US AND OTHER  
MEMBERS OF NATO (TO LESSEN THIS DANGER  
IT WOULD BE IMPORTANT FOR THE US TO TAKE  
A PROMINENT ROLE IN ANNOUNCING AND  
ENFORCING THE "LINKAGE").  
(V) IF THE SOVIET UNION WERE RESOLUTELY  
TO OPPOSE SUCH A "TRADE-OFF", THERE  
COULD BE SERIOUS CONSEQUENCES FOR  
DETENTE.

D. A WARNING TO THE SOVIET UNION THAT, EVEN IF THE RESULTS  
IN STAGE II OF THE CSCE WERE SATISFACTORY, ALLIED LEADERS,  
INCLUDING THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, MIGHT NOT FEEL ABLE  
TO ATTEND IN PERSON THE FINAL STAGE OF THE CSCE IF THERE WERE NOT  
PROGRESS ACROSS THE WHOLE FIELD OF DETENTE, INCLUDING MBFR.  
ADVANTAGES

(I) THIS APPROACH WOULD HIT THE USSR AT A  
PARTICULARLY SENSITIVE SPOT, NAMELY  
THEIR ATTACHMENT TO A "TOP LEVEL"  
CONCLUSION OF THE CSCE.  
(II) IF THE WARNING WERE DELAYED UNTIL  
STAGE II OF THE CSCE WERE COMPLETE, IT  
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WOULD NOT ENTAIL ANY INTERFERENCE WITH

THE COURSE OF STAGE II NEGOTIATIONS,  
WHERE THE ALLIANCE WOULD CONTINUE TO  
WORK FOR OPTIMUM RESULTS.  
(III) OPPORTUNITIES FOR SOVIET WEDGE-DRIVING  
WOULD BE REDUCED.

DISADVANTAGES

(I) THE PROBLEM OF DECIDING ON THE REQUIRED  
SOVIET QUID PRO QUO IN MBFR WOULD REMAIN.  
(II) IF THE EFFECT WAS TO DELAY OR APPEAR TO  
JEOPARDIZE THE HOLDING OF STAGE III,  
THERE MIGHT BE DIFFICULTIES WITH THE  
NEUTRALS AND PUBLIC OPINION. THE ALLIANCE  
COULD HOWEVER ANSWER ANY CRITICISM BY  
EXPRESSING COMPLETE WILLINGNESS TO ATTEND  
A FINAL STAGE AT FOREIGN MINISTER LEVEL  
AS ORIGINALLY PREFERRED BY THE WEST, AND  
COULD ALSO MAINTAIN THAT OTHER STATES  
WOULD BE FREE TO SEND THEIR HEADS OF  
GOVERNMENT IF THEY WISHED.

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